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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE MARTIN ENGLISH
and UNITED PACIFIC
INSURANCE
COMPANY '
.
a corporat10n,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
vs.
DAIRYLAND MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant and
Respondent.

Case No.
11156

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for declaratory judgment on
an automobile liability insurance policy.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
1. The lower court, as a matter of law, denied
appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment in their
favor wherein they requested the lower court to
declare judgment that defendant's policy afforded
liability coverage for George Martin English for
1
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claims arising out of an accident occurring May 14
1966, in Salt Lake County.
'
2. The lower court, as a matter of law, granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment declaring defendant's policy did not afford liability
coverage for ~he claims arising from the accident
of May 14, 1966, and entered judgment in favor
of the defendant and against the plaintiffs on December 26, 1967.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the judgment in
the lower court and judgment in their favor as a
matter of law. They pray that the lower court be
ordered to make and enter judgment declaring that
George Martin English was an insured of Dairyland
Mutual Insurance Company at the time and place
of the accident on May 14, 1966.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
PARTIES
Defendant Dairyland Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter called Dairyland), is an insurance company at all times herein mentioned authorized to engage in writing automobile liability insurance in the State of Utah. Plaintiff, George M.
English, (hereinafter called English), is an individual residing in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff
United Pacific Insurance Company, (hereinafter
called United), is an insurance company at all times
2
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herein mentioned duly authorized to engage in the
insurance business in the State of Utah.
DAIRYLAND'S COVERAGE
(Exhibit P. 1)
English purchased policy No. 42-014844 from
Daiyland for a premium of $266. This policy was
in full force and effect from June 9, 1965, to June
9, 1966. The policy afforded limits of $10,000/20,000
BI and $5,000 PD liability coverage.
In addition, under Section II of said policy, it
provided that supplementary defense p a y me n ts
would be made and that Dairyland would defend
all suits against the insured English and pay all expenses and costs incurred in defending English
against any claim for damages.
The automobile described on Dairyland's policy
was a 1964 Chevrolet Sport Impala. Section IV of
Dairyland's policy is a clause of expansion and extends coverage to replacement vehicles. Section IV,
subparagraph 4, provides:
"Newly Acquired Automobile - an automobile ownership of which is acquired by the
nan;ed insured or his spouse if a resident of
the same household, if ( i) it replaces an auix!mobile owned by either and covered by ~his
policy, or the company insures all automobiles
owned by the named ~nsured and .~uch spouse
on the date of its delivery, and (ii) the named Insured or such spouse notjties the CO'Y}'lpany within thirty days following such deliv3
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ery date. \he insurance with respect to the
newly acqmred automobile does not apply to
any loss against which the named Insured or
~uch spouse has other valid and collectible
ms~r~nce. The l}amed Insured shall pay any
additional premmm required because of the
application of ~nsurance to such newly acqmred automobile." (Emphasis added).
AUTOMOBILE TRADES BY ENGLISH
On February 15, 1966, English traded the 1964
Sport Impala described on Dairyland's policy to Majestic Motors of Salt Lake City for a 1964 Monza
Corvair and a 1961 Monza Corvair (R. 55, 61, 62).
No notice of this trade of automobiles was given to defendant Dairyland by English (R. 55, 61,
62).
Approximately ten weeks later on April 28,
1966, English and his wife traded the 1961 Monza
Corvair and 1964 Monza Corvair in on a single 1966
Corvair Monza convertible. Dairyland was notified
on May 20, 1966, that the 1966 Monza Corvair had
been delivered to English. Actual notice was given
to Dairyland on May 20, 1966, following an accident
that occurred on May 14, 1966 while English was
using the 1966 Monza Corvair (R. 55, 61, 62).
RATES AND FILING
Dairyland admits the premium rate for liability coverage on the 1966 Monza Corvair was and
4
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is exactly the same as on the 1964 Sport Impala (R.
41, 45).
Dairyland filed proof of financial responsibility
for the period of its policy June 9, 1965 to June 9,
1966. And Dairyland admits its policy was in force
and effect on the date of the accident and does not
claim its policy was invalid or void at the time of
the accident ( R. 42, 45).
INVOLVE ME NT OF UNITED
On April 28 at the time English purchased a
1966 Monza, Mrs. English, on behalf of her husband
and herself, applied for complete insurance from
the Archer-Ackerlind Agency. She explained her
requirements to Mr. Ackerlind and arranged to
have coverage effective on the 1966 Monza from
April 28, 1966, covering comprehensive, collision,
$100 deductible and medical payments. Further, she
requested liability coverage, $10,000/20,000 BI and
$5,000 PD, to be in effect from April 28, 1966, or
upon the expiration of Dairyland's liability coverage. Mrs. English couldn't furnish Mr. Ackerlind
the expiration date of Dairyland's policy and therefore he agreed to obtain coverage for Mrs. English,
with the understanding that the comprehensive collision and medical pay would take effect on April
28, 1966, and the liability would take effect on that
date or upon the date of the expiration of the policy
of Dairyland if that policy was still in effect and
still affording coverage. Before the date of expira5
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tion of Dail'yland's policy was obtained for Mr. Ackerlind, the accident occurred ( R. 64, 65).
After the accident occurred, Mr. Ackerlind reported the accident to Dairyland and United.
United was advised by English that Dairyland
disclaimed coverage for the accident because English had not reported delivery to Dairyland of the
two interim 1961 Monza Corvairs within thirty
days of their delivery to English.
Thereafter, United reasoned that if Dairyland's policy did not afford coverage, its policy did
afford coverage and English and United agreed that
United would defend the claims of Gray and Nelson against English and then they would seek recovery from Dairyland for the amount of loss, expense, judgment or settlement made.
The reasonableness of United's settlements
with Gray and English is not disputed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
AN INSURANCE POLICY SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO GIVE THE INSURED THE
BROADEST PROTECTION.

In Jorgensen vs. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
(1962), 13 Utah 2d 303, 373 P.2d 580, this court
said a policy should be interpreted to give the insured the broadest protection that could be reasonably
understood by the terms of the policy.
6
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Stout vs. Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Co., (1963), 14 Utah 2d 414, 385 P.2d 608,
holds that in interpreting a liability insurance policy
all doubts are resolved against the insurance company. Effort should be made to interpret an insurance policy to afford coverage and not to deny coverage.
Appellants submit that contrary to the foregoing rules of construction the lower court strictly
construed the policy against English and broadly
construed the policy in favor of Dairyland.
The lower court misinterpreted the newly acquired automobile coverage and required English
to give notice to Dairyland on March 16, 1966, or
before, as to the first trades. However, Dairyland's
policy merely required English to give notice of a
newly acquired automobile within thirty days after
delivery of said automobile to him.
POINT II
FAILURE TO GIVE NOTICE OF FIRST REPLACEMENTS DOES NOT DEFEAT COVERAGE FOR LAST REPLACEMENT AUTOMOBILE.

Kaczmark vs. LaPierrier, ( 1953), Mich., 60
NW 2d 327, correctly states the rule to be followed.
In this case, the insured bought an Oldsmobile to
replace a Packard covered under the policy and then
without giving the insurance company notice of this
change, subsequently acquired a Pontiac to replace
7
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the Oldsmobile and then notified the insurer of this
last acquisition within thirty days of delivery of the
Pontiac to him. In this case the court held the Pontiac was a replacement of the Packard within the
meaning of the automatic insurance clause affording coverage on ne"\v ly acquired automobiles notwithstanding the insured's intervening ownership
of the Oldsmobile.
Appellants submit that if notice was to be given
to the insurance company within thirty days after
the described automobile is traded or sold, the insurance company could easily have made its intention understandable by providing that the company
get notice within thirty days after trading or selling
the described automobile.
If giving notice within thirty days of selling
the described automobile is required, the policy is
ambiguous.
POINT III
AN INSURER CAN NOT RELY ON FAILURE
TO GIVE NOTICE UNLESS PREJUDICE IS
SHOWN.

In Appleman Insurance Law and Practice, Section 4293, it stated the condition requiring reporting during the policy period of a newly acquired
automobile is for premium purposes only and not
intended to effect a denial of coverage.
Appleman's analysis is fair ~nd accu~at~ .in
view of the fact the insurance premmm for bab1hty
8
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coverage on a 1966 Monza Corvair was the same as
the premium for liability coverage on the 1964 Impala described on the policy.
In at least two cases this court has stated that
failure to give notice by an insured is not a defense
unles prejudice is shown. Rasmussen vs. Western
Casualty & Surety Co., (1964), 15 Utah 2d 333, 393
P.2d 376, involved a situation where an insured who
had an audit type policy failed to give the insurer
notice of the vehicle involved in the accident during
a prior year. The insurer, Western Casualty & Surety Co., in that case took the position that failure to
give notice of the automobile during the prior year
defeated coverage. However, the court pointed out
to the insurer that the insured was entitled to coverage and the insurance company's remedy was to collect the additional premium and that it was not entitled to disclaim coverage.
Johnson Red-E-Mix Construction Co. vs. United
Pacific Insurance Co., (1961) 11 Utah 2d 279, 358
P.2d 337, involved a situation where an insured
waited three years to give the insurance company
notice of an accident where the policy required notice as soon as practical. This court said all the insured was required to do was give notice as was
reasonable and that the insured should not be deprived of the benefits for which it paid a premium
when the insurer could not show it was prejudiced
by the lack of notice.
9
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Unless by the replacement of one vehicle for
another the risk has been materially increased there
.
'
is no basis for an insurance company to complain
about failure to give notice within thirty days of delivery of the last replacement vehicle.
Western Casualty & Surety Co. vs. Lund,
(1956), 10 Cir. Okla., 234 F.2d 916, is the leading
federal case on this question from the 10th Circuit.
In this case Sprague purchased a DeSoto automobile
on February 16, 1954. Later, Sprague traded the
DeSoto for a Ford automobile and later traded the
Ford automobile for an Oldsmobile on March 8,
1964. While driving the Oldsmobile Sprague was
involved in an accident and Western Casualty &
Surety Company disclaimed coverage because he had
failed to notify them of the substitution of automobiles within thirty days after the first trade was
made. Western Casualty & Surety Company's policy
defined newly acquired automobile as follows:
"Newly Acquired Automobile - an automobile, ownership of which is acquired by the
named Insured, who is the owner of the de~
cribed automobile, if the named Insured notifies the company within thirty days followin$
the date of its delivery to him and if either it
replaces an automobile described in the policy
or the company insures all automobiles o~ed
by the named i n s u r e d at such delivery
date . . . "
The 10th Circuit Court held the purpose of the
foregoing provision was to provide Sprague with
10
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automatic coverage and said giving of the notice
within thirty days after delivery of the new vehicle
was not a requisite to coverage and that the insured
was covered without giving notice within thirty
days.

Maryland Indemnity & Fire Insurance Exchange vs. Steers, ( 1962) 21 Md. 380, 157 A.2d 803,
involved a situation where a policy was issued in
December of 1955 describing a 1946 Oldsmobile.
Later and sometime prior to April of 1956, the Oldsmobile became inoperative and the insured purchased a 1956 Dodge. The purchase of the Dodge was
not brought to the attention of the insurer and when
the policy was renewed in December of 1956, the
Oldsmobile appeared as the described automobile.
In March of 1957, the insured sold the Dodge and
bought a 1955 Ford transferring the license plates
from the Dodge to the Ford. In November of 1957,
the insured, while driving the Ford, was involved in
a collision and the insurance company endeavored
to disclaim the coverage because of the insured's
failure to notify the company of the first replacement of the Oldsmobile with the Dodge. The court
held the replacement of the Oldsmobile with the
Dodge and the Dodge with the Ford was not material and was in fact immaterial under the terms
of the policy as there was no increase in hazard and
then held the Ford to be covered as a newly acquired
replacement automobile.
11
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Ashgrove Lime and Portland Cement Co. vs.
Southern Surety Co., ( 1931), 225 Mo. App. 712,
39 SW 2d 434, is an early leading case on this subject. In this case, the insured exchanged an automobile for one listed on the policy. No notice of the exchange was given and five months later after the
date of exchange, an accident occurred. The policy
required no notice of an exchange as a con di ti on of
the policy to afford coverage. The Missouri Court
held the notice provision was not for the purpose of
allowing the insured to say whether or not it was
willing to exchange coverage for a newly acquired
automobile, but was rather to protect the insurer in
collecting an additional premium on such cars. The
court concluded the provision was not a condition
precedent to coverage as the policy contained no
forfeiture provision for failure to perform the condition. Since this case was decided many other authorities have yielded to this line of reasoning.
The provision in Dairyland's policy in the newly
acquired automobile clause providing that the named insured shall pay any additional premium required because of the application of insurance to
such newly acquired automobile, shows the purpose
of notice to be for collection of premium and not for
denial of coverage.
National Indemnity Co. vs. Giampapa, (1965),
62 Wash. 2d ______ , 399 P.2d 81, discusses the term
newly acquired automobile. In this case, Kilmer, the
12
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insured, purchased an automobile liability policy
covering a 1949 Cadillac with an effective policy
period from September 16, 1960 to September 16,
1961. On March 11, 1961, the Cadillac became inoperable and Kilmer thereafter used a 1956 Ford
he had owned when he acquired the policy designating the 1949 Cadillac. No notice was given to the
company that Kilmer desired to substitute the 1956
Ford for the Cadillac until after an accident occurred on March 15, 1961, while Kilmer was operating the Ford. The Washington Court held there
was coverage as to the 1956 Ford on the theory the
Ford was a replacement for a car that had been
junked. The court said the purpose of the notice provision was to limit the liability of the insurance company to the operation of one automobile by an insured.

Birch vs. Harbor Insurance Co., (1954), 126
C.A. 2d 714, 272 P.2d 784, is a case involving an
identical provision relating to coverage on a newly
acquired automobile. In this case, newly acquired
automobile was defined as follows:
" ( 4) Newly Acguired Auto~oile -. an automobile ownership of which is acquired by the
named' insured who is the owner of the described automobile, if the named insured notifies the company within thirty d~ys follo~
ing the date of its delivery ~o him, .and }f
either it replaces an automo?1le described m
this policy or the company u~sures all automobiles owned by the named msured at such
13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

delivery date; but the insurance with respect
to the newly acquired automobile does not
~pply to any loss against which the named
msured has other valid and collectible insura!lce. The n~med insured shall pay any addit10:r;ial prem1u~ required because of the application of the msurance to such newly acquired automobile."
In this case the policy described a 1950 Ford
and was issued to one Martin on July 5, 1950, for a
term of one year. On the evening of November 22,
1950, Martin acquired and took delivery of a 1935
Chevrolet. On the afternoon of September 22, 1950,
Martin was involved in an automobile accident while
driving the Chevrolet. In this case the court held
there was coverage for Martin as the Chevrolet replaced the described automobile saying there was
coverage for a thirty day period involving the replacement automobile even though no notice of delivery of the additional automobile had been given.
In Hoffman vs. Illinois National Casualty Co.,
(1947) 159 F.2d 564, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment in favor of an assured under a policy similar to the one involved here. In the
Illinois National Casualty Company policy it was
provided that the named insured notify the company within thirty days following the date of delivery of a newly acquired automobile. The tractor
owned by the plaintiff was involved in an accident
on April 1, 1943. Defendant was notified of this ~c
cident and a claim for damages was made by plam14
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tiff. On April 9, 1943, while the claim was pending
the plaintiff purchased another tractor and ther~
after used this tractor. On April 12, 1943, the claim
for damages to the first tractor was settled and
plaintiff said nothing about wanting coverage on
the new tractor. On April 16, while being operated
by plaintiff's agent, it was involved in a serious accident. The court held there was coverage for the
second accident saying there was automatic coverage on the second tractor for a period of thirty days
after its delivery to the plaintiff or insured.
In Y ahnke vs. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
(1966), 4 Ariz. App. 287, 419 P.2d 548, the facts
are different. However, the Arizona Appellate Court
states there is coverage for a newly acquired automobile if, within thirty days of delivery of it, the
company is notified.
Since coverage is automatic through the thirty
day period after delivery of a newly acquired vehicle, failure to give notice of a newly acquired automobile is not a defense.
In a· recent case the Montana Supreme Court
in G"lacier General Assurance Co. vs. State Farm
Mutual Auto Insurance Co., (1968), ---- Mont..... ,
436 P. 2d 533, the court stated that the "newly acquired automobile" clause is intended to benefit the
insured and should be liberally construed in his favor. The court in this case held that although the
insured did not give notice to the defendant insurer
15
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within thirty days after acquiring the newly acquired automobile as required by the "newly acquired
automobile" clause, the new automobile was covered
as to an accident which occurred during the thirty
day notice period.
In the Glacier General case, Emelyn Stuart,
mother of SherE:an L. Stuart, owned a 1955 Chevrolet covered by a liability policy issued by State
Farm Mutual for a period effective through April
22, 1963. On February 4, 1963, Sherman L. Stuart,
the son, purchased a 1957 Cadillac and obtained
liability coverage on this automobile with Glacier
General effective as of February 4, 1963. On April
8, 1963, Emelyn and Sherman L. Stuart purchased
as joint tenants a 1959 Chevrolet and transferred in
part payment thereof the 1955 Chevrolet insured
under State Farm's policy. Thereafter, on April 22,
1963, Sherman L. Stuart was in an accident while
operating the 1959 Chevrolet. Glacier General afforded coverage under its liability policy to Sherman
L. Stuart. However, State Farm denied coverage to
Emelyn and Sherman L. Stuart and the action was
instituted by Glacier General Assurance to compel
contribution from State Farm for the sums it had
expended in settling claims.
The Montana Court held there was coverage
under the State Farm Mutual policy and that coverage was automatic through the thirty day designated period and that it was immaterial whether
or not the insurance company had notice of a newly
16
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acquired automobile within the thirty day notice
period. The court stated that since coverage was
automatic through the designated period it was immaterial whether or not the insured did not notify
the company of the acquisition of the newly acquired automobile or whether the insured did or did
not pay an additional premium. The court also pointed out that even if Sherman L. Stuart had not intended that he have coverage under the State Farm
policy, that the policy was nevertheless in force and
effect according to its terms and that coverage
should be afforded.
CONCLUSION
The lower court should be reversed and directed
as a matter of law to enter judgment in favor of the
appellants because:
1. English gave notice within twenty-two days
of the delivery of the automobile he was operating
at the time of the accident.

2. The purpose of the notice clause is to assist
the insurance company to collect an additional premmm.
3. The defendant can not show it was prejudiced by the replacement of the 1966 Monza Corvair
for the described 1964 Impala.
4. The lower court erred in holding that notification to Dairyland was required by English on
March 16, 1966.
17
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5. The policy is ambiguous if it requires notice
to be given on March 16, 1966, as claimed by respondent.
6. The insurance policy should be liberally construed to protect the interest of the insured and the
intent of the company is not controlling.
For these reasons appellants respectfully submit the lower court should be reversed and directed
to enter judgment ordering Dairyland to afford coverage to George Martin English for claims arising
out of the accident on May 14, 1966.
Respectfully submitted,
WORS:LEY, SNOW
& CHRISTENSEN
Raymond M. Berry
7th Floor Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for

Plaintiffs and Appellants
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